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 Recently, deep neural networks (DNNs) have been increasingly deployed in 
various healthcare applications, which are considered safety-critical 
applications. Thus, the reliability of these DNN models should be remarkably 
high, because even a small error in healthcare applications can lead to injury 
or death. Due to the high computations of the DNN models, DNNs are often 
executed on the graphics processing units (GPUs). However, the GPUs have 
been reportedly impacted by soft errors, which are extremely serious issues 
in the healthcare applications. In this paper, we show how the fault injection 
can provide a deeper understanding of DenseNet201 model instructions 
vulnerability on the GPU. Then, we analyze vulnerable instructions of the 
DenseNet201 on the GPU. Our results show that the most significant 
vulnerable instructions against soft errors PR, STORE, FADD, FFMA, SETP 
and LD can be reduced from 4.42% to 0.14% of injected faults, after we 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Recently, the success of deep neural network (DNN) in challenging perception tasks makes them a 
powerful tool for many applications, including safety critical system such as healthcare application [1]. For 
instance, DNN is used in surgical procedures where it gives a better understanding of surgical practices and 
automatic recognition of workflow [2], [3]. This and other potential DNN applications are associated with 
high risk of humam injury or death, especially if there is a malfunction. Hence, it should be exceptionally 
reliable [4]-[6]. However, with the growing complexity of modern digital hardware platforms (i.e., GPUs), it 
has become increasingly difficult to guarantee the reliability of hardware operations when DNN models are 
run on top of the hardware (i.e., GPUs) [7]-[9]. Notably, soft errors are caused by a transient signal. This is 
induced by a single energetic particle strike when the collected charge is greater than the critical charge 
required to cause a change in the state of a memory cell, register, latch, or flip-flops [10], [11]. As a result, 
this could eventually lead to misclassification of objects in DNNs, and the consequences would be disastrous. 
Therefore, when the DNNs is performed in GPUs, their reliability implication is not well understood in the 
healthcare applications, because the errors propagate from the GPUs to DNNs (i.e., DenseNet201) [7], [12]. 
Several techniques have been proposed to reduce the soft errors in the GPUs such as double modular 
redundancy (DMR), triple modular redundancy (TMR), and algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT) [13], [14]. 
Nevertheless, the main issue with these solutions is that they have runtime overhead and are not cost 
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effective. To address the above issues, we identified the soft errors propagated in the DNNs to mitigate the 
soft errors. To achieve this, we propose an analysis methodology to inject the DenseNet201 to identify the 
vulnerable instructions to soft errors. As the first aim, we proposed mitigation strategy to reduce the soft 
errors, and we implement it on DenseNet201.  
The main contributions of this work are; i) A methodology to evaluate the probability of fault in 
specific parts of the source code due to errors at the output; ii) Experimental evaluation of the behavior of 
DenseNet201 executed on GPUs exposed to soft errors; iii) Identification of the most vulnerable instructions 
of the DenseNet201 through fault injection; iv) Concretely propose mitigation strategies on how to increase 
DenseNet201 instructions reliability for healthcare applications; v) Validation of DenseNet201 mitigation 
strategies through SASSIFI fault injection. This paper is structured as follows: Previous studies are presented 
in section 2, while our proposed strategies are presented in section 3. Section 4 contains the method, while 
section 5 is the analyses and explanation of findings. Furthermore, evaluation of strategies is presented in 
section 6, after which the conclusion is presented in section 7. 
 
 
2. PREVIOUS WORKS  
Several studies have been conducted on the performance and accuracy issues of DNN accelerators 
and healthcare applications. Jie et al. [15] proposes a novel method to predict heart diseases from 
electrocardiogram (ECG) signals with cardiology, signal processing methods and deep learning model 
(ResNet-34). But the authors did not consider the reliability of such model for the intended application, 
which is actually a safety-critical application, based on real-time convolutional neural network (CNN) model 
detection. Keno et al. [16] compared 15 different CNNs of five different architectures (ResNet, DenseNet, 
VGG, SqueezeNet, Inception v4, and AlexNet) on two chest radiograph classification datasets. This was 
done with the PyTorch and Fast AI libraries on a workstation, running on Ubuntu 18.04 with two Nvidia 
GeForce RTX 2080ti, and all training was done using the Python programming language. However, the 
authors did not consider the reliability of such models for the intended application. In another study by 
Zhiwen et al. [17], a lightweight hybrid neural network (DenseNet) for medical image classification was 
proposed. This consisted of a modified PCANet, cascaded with a simplified DenseNet. The updated PCANet 
has two phases in which at each point, the network produces successful feature maps by combining inputs 
with different learned kernels. With a small number of weights, the following simplified DenseNet will take 
all feature maps provided by the PCANet as inputs and use the dense shortcut links to achieve accurate 
classification of medical images. Experimental results showed that the proposed hybrid neural network is 
simple to train, and in terms of classification accuracy, sensitivity, and specificity, it outperforms 
conventional CNN models such as PCANet, ResNet and DenseNet. Both networks were made for 
acceleration with Python, based on TensorFlow 1.9.0 and Keras 2.2.4 on Ubuntu 16.04, and are run on the 
NVIDIA GTX 1080Ti GPU with CUDA 10.1. Nonetheless, the reliability of the models was not been 
considered. 
Wenping et al. [18], conducted a study on the classification of five major trends of interstitial lung 
disease in healthy tissue, emphysema, ground glass, fibrosis and micronodules. The proper diagnosis of 
interstitial lung disease is helpful in improving the effect of treatment on patients. The paper introduces an 
improved DenseNet called the DenseNet small kernel (SK-DenseNet), to improve the efficiency of interstitial 
lung disease classification. The results of the experiment showed that the proposed SK-DenseNet achieves 
outstanding performance (~98.4 per cent), which increases its performance by 5 % compared to DenseNet. 
The proposed approach has been implemented using the Tensorflow framework and encoded in the Python 
programming language. All experiments were conducted on GPU NVIDIA under the Linux OS. However, 
the authors did not consider the reliability of such model for the intended use. Ahmet et al. [19] intended to 
diagnose brain tumours using a CNN model (Resnet 50). The last 5 layers of the Resnet50 model were 
removed, and 8 new layers were added. With this model, the accuracy value of 97.2 percent was obtained. 
The findings are also consistent with those obtained with the Alexnet, Resnet50, Densenet201, InceptionV3 
and Googlenet models. Among these models, the most effective model was used to categorisze brain tumour 
images. The experiment was carried out in the MATLAB environment with GPU card. However, the authors 
did not consider the reliability of such model for safety-critical application applications. 
There have been relatively few reports that addressed the reliability problems of DNNs through 
DNN accelerators (e.g. GPUs) [20], [21]. One of the major sources of unreliability in modern systems is soft 
errors [22]. This is typically caused by high-energy particles, striking electronic devices, and causing them to 
malfunction (e.g., a single bit flip) [23]. Therefore, most of the traditional applications that are based-on 
GPUs are fault tolerant. More recently however, GPUs are widely used to accelerate safety critical 
applications that are dominated by DNNs models as shown in Table 1. Therefore, it becomes essential to 
understand the behaviour of these applications in the presence of hardware faults [24]. A few studies have 
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evaluated the reliability of DNNs models on GPUs. Specifically, DNN models such as ResNet, VGGNet, and 
GoogLeNet have been examined [10], [25]. However, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first research 
to evaluate the soft error resilience of the DenseNet201 model from the perspective of vulnerability to instructions. 
 
 
Table 1. The summary of the related work 
Ref Addressed Issues Characteristics Technology Limitations 
[15] This study focused on predicting 






The authors did not consider reliability. 
Fault injection to evaluate reliability. 
CNN model DenseNet201 was used 
GPUs with logic units more sensitive to 
soft errors was used. 
[16] This study focused on classification 
of chest radiographs by comparing 
15 different convolutional neural 
networks (CNNs) 
CNNs models  ResNet, 
DenseNet, VGG, 
SqueezeNet, Inception 




The authors did not consider reliability.  
Fault injection was used to evaluate the 
reliability of GPUs where the logic units 
more sensitive to soft errors 
[17] This study focused on  medical 
image classification in the case of a 
small amount of training image 
data 
CNNs model DenseNet NVIDIA 
GTX 1080Ti 
GPU 
The authors did not consider reliability.  
We used fault injection to evaluate the 
reliability of GPUs where the logic units 
more sensitive to soft errors. 
[18] This study focused on classification 
of five main patterns of interstitial 
lung disease healthy tissue, 
emphysema, ground glass, fibrosis, 
and micronodules 
CNNs model DenseNet GPU 
NVIDIA 
The authors did not consider reliability. 
[19] This study aimed to diagnose the 
brain tumor using MRI images. 
CNNs model ResNet50 GPU 
NVIDIA 
The authors did not consider reliability. 
Fault injection to evaluate reliability by 
used CNN model DenseNet201 
 
 
3. PROPOSED MITIGATION  STRATEGY 
In this section, we propose our mitigation strategy by identifying the most vulnerable instructions 
for DenseNet201, via fault injection (soft errors). In order to identify the most vulnerable instructions in the 
DenseNet201 model, we present a method (in section 4.1). The key concept of our mitigation strategy is that 
it is based on the well-known triple modular redundancy (TMR), and it intertwines three copies of the 
instructions and adds majority voting. In short, this strategy mitigation consists of triple instructions, by 
means of majority voters. Based on this concept, our mitigation strategy is a selective solution that protects 
only the vulnerable instructions instead of duplicating the whole as in TMR, to reduce the overheads, and 




4.1.  Fault injection settings 
Fault injection experiments are very reliable method to measure the soft errors (SDCs, Masked and 
DUEs). However, to correlate soft errors to a particular resource or code region, it is important to employ 
fault injection. In this study, we used NVIDIA GPU, SASSIFI “fault injector” and DenseNet201 (see section 
4.2). We injected errors at the GPU to test the program vulnerability factor (PVF) of the DenseNet201, which 
is the likelihood that the performance of a program will be propagated by a single fault that modifies the 
outcome of instruction. Thus, to measure PVF of the program, we inject errors with; i) instruction output 
address (IOA) mode to study the probability that the address instruction has errors, and ii) instruction output 
value (IOV) mode to study the probability that the value executed instruction has errors. Then, we injected 
1000 injections at IOA and IOV, but we are interested in faults that are not masked and make their way to the 
application (e.g., Masked SDC). 
 
4.2.  DENSENET201 
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are used for all state-of-the-art vision tasks such as image 
recognition, object detection and localization, and segmentation. The latest new architecture is from 
Facebook AI research (FAIR), and it won the best paper at the most prestigious conference on computer 
vision in 2017: computer vision and pattern recognition (CVPR) [26]. Their architecture was called 
DenseNet, which implemented a new block called dense block and stacked these blocks on top of each other, 
with some layers in between, to create a deep network. These dense blocks took the idea of residual networks 
a step further and linked each layer to other. In other words, for a dense block, we consider all the dense 
blocks before it to be input, and we generate the output that we feed into all the subsequent dense blocks. We 
apply convolutions and batch normalizations to render layers consistent with each other. The advantage of 
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this is that we promote the reuse of features, overcome the gradient problem, and have less overall 
parameters. This arrangement ensures the optimal flow of information between all layers on the network, and 
directly links all layers (matching the size of the function map). In order to maintain the characteristics of 
forward spread, each layer receives additional feedback from all the layers ahead and transfers its own 
character mapping to all subsequent layers Figure 1. The L layer receives the feature-maps of all preceding 
layers, 𝑋0……… . . 𝑋𝐿−1 as input: 
 
𝑥1 = 𝐻1(𝑥0, 𝑥1, ……… , 𝑥𝑙−1)  
 
where 𝑋0……… . . 𝑋𝐿−1 refers to the concatenation of the features-maps produced in 0,.(l-1) layers. We use 
densenet201, which consists of 4 dense blocks of 201 layers in total. Each layer involves the application of a 
convolution philtre followed by ReLU, activation and line-wise batch normalisation. For each dense block, a 





Figure 1. Five layers of a DenseNet block with a growth rate of 4 feature-maps per layer [26] 
 
 
5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS DISCUSSION  
Based on the method discussed in section 4, in this section we show our result dissection by 
analysing the DenseNet201 instructions vulnerability. 
 
5.1.  Instruction group’s vulnerability analysis 
In this subsection, we evaluate the resilience of the DenseNet201 models from low-level instructions 
perspective. It is worth mentioning that this metric will be achieved by injecting errors into addresses and 
values of the executing instructions. Here, we intended to evaluate the sensitivity of various instructions by 
measuring the instruction vulnerability factor (IVF), which is the probability that a single soft error that 
modifies the result of an instruction will propagate to a program output. SASSIFI provides many predefined 
instruction groups, and based on our application (DenseNet201), we evaluate and analyze the IVF of the 
following instruction groups: 
 Instructions that write to general-purpose registers (GPR). 
 Instructions that write to condition-code registers (CC). 
 Instructions that write to predicate registers (PR). 
 Store instructions (STORE). 
 Integer add and multiply instructions (IADD_IMUL_OP). 
 Single-precision floating-point add and multiply instructions (FADD_FMUL_OP). 
 Integer fused multiply and add instructions (MAD_OP). 
 Single-precision floating-point fused multiply-add instructions (FFMA_OP). 
 Load instructions (LD_OP). 
 Register (SETP_OP). 
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We performed 1000 injections using the single bit-flip model in the IOA and IOV modes and show 
the results in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. We noticed that IOA mode is based on only two predefined 
instruction groups-GPR and STORE, which are enough to disturb the address of the destination register. On 
the other hand, IOV mode is based on many instruction groups. We can easily observe the amount of SDC 
and DUE errors that are produced by each instruction group in both injection modes (i.e. IOA and IOV). 
In the Figure 2, injections into both instructions GPR and STORE were masked (32.65%) and 
(35.05%) respectively, while producing the same amount of SDCs (9.80%). In contrast, GPR producing 
DUEs (7.45%) and STORE producing (5.5%) DUE errors. Thus, both instructions seem to have the same 
vulnerability in IOA mode. 
In Figure 3 starting PR, STORE, FADD, FFMA, SETP, and LD appears to be the most vulnerable 
instructions at all with average of SDCs 4.42%. This is an extremely high percentage, and it is unacceptable 
for safety-compliant systems. Injections with these six instructions PR, STORE, FADD, FFMA, SETP, and 
LD in DenseNet201 masked only (6.66%, 5.29%, 5.17%, 5.42, 6.83% and 3.97%) of the errors, respectively. 
On the other hand, PR and SETP produced small DUEs. These findings indicates that PR, STORE, FADD, 
FFMA, SETP in DenseNet201 are the most vulnerable instructions against soft errors. There are two 
probable reasons for this: i) as CNN models are basically built of many layers (i.e., computationally hungry), 
they load data (i.e., with LD instructions) as many times as the number of layers in the model; ii) most of the 
CNN architectures including DenseNet201 greatly relies on instructions (i.e., SETP DenseNet201) in their 
operations. These require the attention of researchers who work on GPU architecture designing or CNN 
model building to take the reliability issue into considerations. This is particularly important when the CNN 
model is intended to be used in some safety-critical environments. Meanwhile, GPR, IADD, and MAD 
instructions have moderate error resilience, where each of these instructions produced number of SDC errors 
on the average of 1.32% and masked 4.14%, 3.08% and 4.12% respectively. Injecting fault into the value 
(IOV) of the STORE instruction is not same as injecting into its address (IOA). Significantly, at least 4.71% 
of the injected IOV STORE faults became SDCs, while masking about 5.29%. However, it is surprising that  
no DUE has been generated. It is worth mentioning that CC instruction is a one-bit operations. In other 
words, they only perform toggle between zero and one, thus, we can only inject single-bit-flip faults. From a 
reliability perspective, every single fault has been injected to CC instruction was masked, therefore, no SDC 
or DUE has been observed.  
Thus, we can identify the vulnerable instruction groups in DenseNet201, and some key observations 
include: i) in our application (DenseNet201), injecting errors in GPR and STORE in IOA mode often results 
in higher SDC and DUE probabilities when compared to respective IOV; ii) injecting errors in STORE in 
IOV does not result DUE errors; ii) injecting errors into CC registers did not have any effect on the program 





Figure 2. Outcomes of injections in instruction 
groups (IOA mode) DenseNet201 
 
Figure 3. Outcomes of injections in instruction groups 
(IOV mode) DenseNet201 
 
 
6. EVALUATION OF THE MITIGATION STRATEGY 
In this section we duplicated only the vulnerable instruction groups in the model, by applying our 
mitigation strategy in the DenseNet201 via executing the instruction three times and voting afterwards. 
Figures 4 and 5 shows the instructions group after applying the mitigation strategy. As can be seen, PR, 
STORE, FADD, FFMA, SETP, and LD are the most vulnerable instructions in DenseNet201, and most of the 
SDCs errors transformed to mask. In Figure 4, both instructions GPR and STORE was masked on the 
average of 42.38% from the errors that were injected. On another hand, both instructions produced small 
SDCs errors on the average of about 0.8% errors. However, in Figure 5, instructions PR, STORE, FADD, 
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FFMA, SETP, and LD masked errors that was injected, with an average SDCs of about 0.14% for all. This is 
a significant improvement after we applied our mitigation strategy solution. In contrast, all the instructions 





Figure 4.  Outcomes of hardened instruction groups 
(IOA mode) DenseNet201 
 
Figure 5. Outcomes of hardened instruction groups 
(IOV mode) DenseNet201 
 
 
6.1.  Mitigation strategy before vs N-modular redundancy  
N-Modular Redundancy (i.e., Triple Modular Redundancy) has been widely used for soft errors 
masking for high reliablity GPUs application (DenseNet). It is implemented by instantiating 3 copies of all 
the given DNNs model kernels (i.e., instructions) and by performing a majority voting on the outputs of all 
instructions. The output given by the majority of the DNNs model will propagate through the voter and if the 
majority gives the correct output, faults in the other modules are being masked. Nevertheless, the main issue 
with these solutions is that they have runtime overhead and are not cost effective. Therefore, it is important to 
better identify the vulnerable instruction portions of the DNNs application (DenseNet) and to reduce the SDC 
rate with cost-effective and low overhead (see section 3). Tables 2 and 3 summarizes the errors injection, and 
the instruction groups after applying our mitigation strategy solution. 
 
 
Table 2. IOA mode instructions group before and after mitigation strategy 
 IOA IOA* 
IGID Masked DUE SDC Masked DUE SDC 
GPR 32.65% 7.45% 9.80% 42.30% 7.15% 0.65% 
STORE 35.05% 5.15% 9.80% 42.45% 0.95% 0.95% 
IOA = With fault injection (soft errors) 
IOA* = After applying Mitigation Strategy 
 
 
Table 3. IOV mode instructions group before and after mitigation strategy 
 IOV IOV* 
IGID Masked DUE SDC Masked DUE SDC 
GPR 4.14% 4.42% 1.44% 4.98% 4.96% 0.06% 
CC 10.00% 0.00% 0.00% 10.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PR 6.66% 0.05% 3.29% 9.74% 0.04% 0.22% 
STORE 5.29% 0.00% 4.71% 9.82% 0.00% 0.18% 
IADD 3.08% 5.90% 1.02% 3.53% 6.39% 0.08% 
FADD 5.17% 0.00% 4.83% 9.81% 0.00% 0.19% 
MAD 4.12% 4.39% 1.49% 4.90% 5.02% 0.08% 
FFMA 5.42% 0.00% 4.58% 10.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
SETP 6.83% 0.07% 3.10% 9.77% 0.07% 0.16% 
LD 3.97% 0.00% 6.03% 9.89% 0.00% 0.11% 
IOV = With fault injection (soft errors) 




In this paper, we have analyzed the error resilience of DenseNet201, a well-known DNNs model, 
from the perspective of instructions level. Our analysis showed that DenseNet201 is more prone to SDC than 
DUE errors, which are more crucial because they modify th emodel’s final output. Accordingly, we found 
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that PR, STORE, FADD, FFMA, SETP and LD are the top vulnerable instructions against soft errors for IOV 
mode. Specifically, these instructions generate 3.29%, 4.41%, 4.83%, 4.58, 3.10% and 6.03% SDC errors 
respectively in the injection mode. In contrast, these instructions generated only 0.22%, 018%, 0.19%, 
0.00%, 0.16% and 0.11% SDC errors respectively, after applying our mitigation strategy. ThereforeHence, 
our mitigation strategy solution shows high capacity to mitigate soft errors in the instruction levels of the 
DenseNet201 model. For DUE errors, we suggest GPU architects who design specialized GPUs in deep 
learning to design watchdog circuits integrated into the GPU to detect crashes, and to promote the reliability 
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